My dad was an Aviation Machinist Mate in a CASU unit during the war. He was stationed at Pearl Harbor and San Diego. It's good to see them getting some recognition here.

My dad flew an F6F-5 with VF-19 aboard the USS Lexington in the summer and fall of 1944. In October, '44, his plane was shot up by Japanese AAA fire twice. Once it was a 20mm hit on the prop hub which drained most of the oil. The engine brought him back to CV-16, was replaced, and the plane went back into service. The second time, his plane was hit at least twice (engine & port wing root) by Japanese 40mm AAA. Mangled plane still brought dad back to the Lexington. It was deemed "not repairable," and pushed over the side into the Pacific, to be replaced by a new F6F-5 in a day or two. The "throwaway" culture existed by the autumn of 1944…

I remember reading somewhere of an account of a New Zealand airgroup that was moved to an American base. The pilots were walking through a row of Corsairs admiring the low hours and sharp still dark factory paint jobs when an American ground crew chief asked them what the hell they were doing. After explaining how much nicer the planes were to their worn Corsairs he just laughed and held up a clipboard. They were airframe considered having too many hours being shipped out to be refurbished and replaced. After the shock left the faces of the Kiwis whose own planes had more than triple the hours, they began bartering out how paperwork could get mixed up and their planes accidentally get shipped off instead. 😂

Didn't Yamamoto mention something about having about 6 months to accomplish Japan's goals in the Pacific before American industrial capacity became an insurmountable problem?

One takeaway from this video is that not only did the US have material and productive superiority, but also employed superior organizational skills and advanced planning to better leverage that material advantage.

Japan could have won Midway, killed every USN carrier afloat in 1942, and still would have lost the war of industries and pilot training.

One big factor for instance at Midway was top-flight damage control. But the real answer is simply: infinite amounts of fuel, spares, and crew. Japan was massively constrained in all categories. People only count the big carriers but the US ended the war with something like 90 escort carriers, absolutely insane.

I think it’s worth mentioning that the Japanese believed that a single decisive blow could dealt against the US navy and would result in the USA suing for peace. This is partly because in 1905 Japan had successfully employed this tactic against Russia which was a world power and won the Russo-Japanese War. What they failed to take into account was the full potential of modern war machines and the differences between 1900s Russia and 1940s US.

I love learning about US WW2 logistic capabilities. We got floating airports out the wazoo, floating mechanic shops, and even floating ice cream factories! EDIT: Can't forget about the floating fuel stations either. 😂

Simply put, Japan lacked the essential resources it needed to sustain a war with America. Even Admiral Yamamoto knew this. He knew once the American industry got going, Japan couldn't win, and the battle of Midway was a clear sign that it was the beginning of the end for the Japanese navy having lost all but one carrier and not having the resources or the industry to replace them like America could.

1944: "Who needs overhauls? I just grab a new plane from the pile!"

Amateurs think about tactics. Professionals think about logistics.

I don't believe American troops or commanders are, on average, any better than anyone else's trained troops, but they have the *best* logistics in the world. My grandfather fought at Kokoda, and he was immensely grateful for US involvement. To quote him, "Thank God for the Americans."

Outstanding Chris. Few people ever talk about logistics. My grandfather was in logistics for the army during WWII. He always stressed the need for such. I think as a result, the man was always prepared nearly anything that came up, even late in life. Cheers

The US Navy has sadly forgotten a few of these lessons in recent times; fleet readiness has hit low ebb in recent years due to extensive downsizing and shuttering of naval shipyards around the US, a process which has been quietly happening since the end of Cold War tensions… The Navy of 2023 is in a similarly dire state of readiness to fight a naval war on the Pacific as it was in 1933.

another very good book on the logistics of the US Navy in the pacific is "Beans Bullets and Black Oil" by Rear Adm Worrall Reed Carter.

I think you may be missing an interesting nuance. But the only evidence I can furnish comes from a US Army source. The source is an unpublished book titled "Final Report of the U.S. Army Service Forces." The book was dated 1949, I believe I recall. It could be found in the Army-Navy Library in the Pentagon. Reading it in 1983 left a deep and lasting impression on a young logistician (me). We have to imagine a logistics operation of staggering scope and detail, managed entirely by hard copy (paper). It was impossible to quickly supply essential parts to Army units scattered across vast oceans and land masses who were in constant and unpredictable motion. And so 'push logistics' were used. I'll explain that term in a moment. The Army Service Forces (ASF) provided acquisition, distribution, manuals and more to support the Army at home and overseas. At the start of the war, it was a small outfit headed by a lieutenant Colonel. Nowadays the same responsibility warrants a four star general. 'Push Logistics' involves trying to guess where the troops will be months in advance, and guessing what they'll need, and organizing shipments of all classes of supply to those locations. Well, it worked, sort of. But not very well. Mountains of crates were unloaded onto beaches and in ports, often enough where the troops *were,* as opposed to where they *are.* Those mountains of crates were often left out in the open, in mud. Labels vanished. With a war to fight, those mountains of supply were often abandoned. We saw the same thing happen in Viet Nam. Vast, vast stores of irretrievable supplies stacked to the heavens, nobody knowing what, exactly, was there. It might as well have been shipped to the moon, for all the good those supplies did for the troops. So if an urgent requirement needed to be solved fast, we did the same thing thing in Nam that the Army did in WWII. We flew parts from the States marked 'urgent,' or we pillaged hanger queens. I suspect the Navy did the same thing during WWII: they pushed supplies forward based on forecasts that were rapidly overcome by events; and when production of airframes attained an oversupply, hanger queens were the fastest, easiest way to keep airframes in the air. They probably flew urgent parts, too, but you can't keep a war machine that big generously supplied by air. Doesn't work. Computers and communications today have changed the math for logistics, and the monumental cost of high-tech weapons systems have made 'push logistics' fall out of favor. Now it's almost all 'pull logistics.' The warfighter, not rear echelon weenies like me, decides what to demand. Mostly. But it's probably inevitable that if we get into a serious war with a near-peer, the weenies will hit the panic button and try to push. And hanger queens aren't going to go away.

As someone that worked in US Marine Corps aviation maintenance from the 1990s to the 2010s, it's nice to see this video. Any sort of talk about the maintenance and upkeep of any air service, whether land or carrier based, tends to be totally ignored. It's simply not a sexy topic. The air services of the Japanese army and navy faced nothing but problems with little help in terms of logistics, maintenance. It's not just enough planes and pilots. The whole system to build, maintain aircraft, especially further away from home in the South Pacific, was a nightmare for them. The animosity between the Japanese navy and army made it even worse. These issues were brought up by the maintenance personnel, but in typical Japanese military fashion, they were told to shut up. They weren't doing their jobs with enough "spirit."

Many historians decried the 1920s treaties with Japan that limited the number of our forward bases. Others have claimed that it was a blessing in disguise, by forcing the Navy to develop stronger logistics & support divisions. This film seems to support that. Today most folks don't grasp the then-current reaction to FDR's call for 50,000 airplanes. Many thought him insane, in the same was the press ridiculed Reagan's SDI (dubbed "star wars" by the media). Churchill was one of the few who had a strong grasp of what America was capable of. In Martin Caidin's The Zero Fighter an IJN Lieutenant recounts the time he proposed an American style pilot training program, as he properly foresaw shortages after 1942. The high brass thought the plan outrageously overblown. Good thing they ignored him.

1 hell of a video thank you the books you gave info on 2 mega 👍👍

Great video on an important topic. My grandfather worked as a machinist mate in the Pacific during the Second World War, and I can see how important was his role in repairing engines. BTW - the interior organization of your videos with sub-titles is truly awesome and informative.

As a Navy AMH2 in the 90s, its good to see that maintenance and technicians are highlighted. For every 1 pilot, there are more than a dozen of us making it possible.

My grandfather was a land based armorer in the USN, unfortunately he died when I was really little but I believe he was attached to VF-17 in the Solomons at one point

From a former technician, thank you for this. (not WW II.)

Royal Navy had HMS Unicorn, HMS Pioneer and HMS Perseus, light carriers with extra hanger space equipped to undertake complete overhauls at sea or transport aircraft back to land, they each carried two smaller lighters (barges) to ferry aircraft which couldn't fly to the maintenance carrier and to transport bulky items like engines.

Japan never sent pilots back to train new recruits.

Towards the end of the war, it often became more practical to simply shove damaged planes over the side rather than repair them. The photo at 5:00 gave me a jolt; a first glance, the sailor in front looks a lot like my dad.

Great video, full of not often thought of issues that are war winning or losers. You hear about the fact that Japan could build Great fighters in 1945 but the good pilots are dead and haven't been replaced. I never thought of the depot level maintenance part of a campaign. Keep up the great work.

I am a huge fan of Naval air, especially Pacific World War II operations. I’ve watched endless videos about Navy operations in the South Pacific, but yours was probably the most informative of explaining why the US won the war! Thank you for an excellent video! Go NAVY!

This video illustrates the reason my grandfather who was a tool & die maker for an aircraft manufacturer was told that he would never be allowed anywhere near combat and to stay in the job he had.

Alexander the Great’s said, “My logisticians are a humorless lot ... they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay."

This is a fascinating and very underserved topic, thank you for sharing this information!

Brilliant video: a crucial and frequently-overlooked element of the Pacific war. It would be fascinating, but challenging, to compare the Japanese approach to these problems. I suspect it was drastically different.

As someone who works at an aircraft component overhaul center and having worked on landing gear overhauls and now on engine components, just seeing all the work needed to overhaul these components really drives home how intricate and important such advanced planned is. Gotta plan out the facilities, the tooling, the labor and so on. Just to overhaul things on time when they come in every ten years. Now imagine that for the armed forces on such a large scale at war.... truly mind boggling. Learned a lot from this video, truly the stuff never talked about. But the impact is obvious. Fantastic video Chris.

Excellent video as always. I am curious as to how the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm built up their sustainment capacity. HMS Unicorn was a proof of them realising the need to sustain the air groups. And RAF also had been focusing on a system where repairs and training of aircrew and ground crew were set up "for the long haul". But how did the Fleet Air Arm achieve this? Especially considering they only became part of the navy again in 1936 and had to play hard catch up after years of neglect and being down prioritized by the RAF?

There are 2 words every maintainer hates hearing: "Hangar...Queens" those are some long hours getting Hangar Queens FMC

My brother-in-law, Tom Collins, was a "T-5" enlisted Marine. He started his war at Midway, immediately after the battle. VMF-223 was a reinforcement unit for that place. As an "enlisted aviator", Tom flew hundreds of hours "breaking in" overhauled engines. Ultimately, he was used to fly resupply missions to Iwo Jima, flying wounded out at dawn. He loved the SBD but the F4U was his favorite.

Another book I didn’t know I needed

Great Video Chris! Next, you should do one on the Naval base at Ulithi, which was a tiny spec of land (not even an island?), that became the largest Naval base in the Pacific during WWII almost overnight. Little known by the public, but a massive feat of logistics.

Thank you very, very much, Chris. This is hugely informative and insightful. It almost seems as if military professionals would really want to focus on logistics.

Always learn something new here. Thanks Chris!

LOGISTICS IS THE most important attribute of any offensive, campaign or battle. The frontline , tip of the spear grunt, is 100% reliant on the POGUES back in the Quartermaster store, to bring them bullets, food, fuel, first aid supplies, weapons etc.... only 5 to 10 % of soldiers are fighting, the rest make up all the support and logistics that make the frontline soldiers be able to do what they do. And dont forget the cooks and chaplains...

Excellent compact, detailed and thorough explanations. Superb visuals as well. Great presentation.

great video! I look forward to reading some the books that you highlighted.

“Numbers do not win a battle.” “No, but I bet they help.” Especially when backed by good logistics.

Another thorough video. Thank you!

Have to remeber that usa also surplied uk (and well canada and austrailia that still was part of uk) as well as ussr with engines as well as some airframes. By 1942 ussr aircraft engine production was over run and the only engine they could get for quite a while was via convoys. Uk also had a lack of engines, so usa had to peoduce for both of them. The had to ramp up production by a insane anount. Granted, this ramping up started alreddy in 1939

There was a lecture on exactly this topic recently on the excellent WW2TV UKposts channel. I am sure Chris will not mind me plugging this excellent resource here.

Nice vid again! Cool footage too of Clark Gable during his service as an aerial gunner (even though he was in the USAAF and not the USN) that I had never seen before.

Thank you for the video, love your work.

Thanks Chris. Great video. Learned a lot as I am a carrier fan!

Another brilliant, meticulously researched video, Chris! Bravo!! 😎

Japan misunderstood Mahone. They were so focused on Kati Kessene as a single battle that they sought to fight a symmetrical war against America on terms that America was well equipped for. What they should have done is treat the whole war as the Kati Kessene and gone asymmetrical. That means submarines and fast Heavy Cruisers equipped with Long Lance torpedo's. Not aircraft carrier's.

My dad worked at Lockheed a year or so before the US entered the war. When he joined the Navy at the onset of hostilities between the US and Japan. He was placed in a "Rated" company. He left boot camp as a Aircraft Structural Mechanic third class petty officer. This was because he had the experience for which the Navy was desperate. I am sure this was repeated in the Army and Marines as well. Dad spent the entire war at NAS San Diego, repairing aircraft.

Awesome video! I had never thought of the support structure for keeping the planes in the aie.

You can have your reservations about the goals of the American military industrial complex and at the same time admire the fact that Americans are really, really good at war. They remind me of the Romans really.

The US Navy had very little in the Pacific in 1942. Japan had a chance until Midway, at least in the short-term. Truth is, they should have never gone after Midway, and concentrated all six flattops in the Coral Sea. Even if they took Midway, they had no way to resupply it. Of course, once the Essex Class Carriers started rolling off the slipways, along with their hundreds of escorts, and the fleet's logistical tail was developed, along with better aircraft models, it was over. By 1943, Japan had lost. 1944's carrier battles did little more than confirm it.

THAT was an incredibly informative video!!! You ROCK!!! KEEP UP THE HARD WORK!!! 👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍

"Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics." -Gen. Omar Bradley

Another first class video. You really shine when it comes to this "four dark dusty corners" kind of subject matter. After a person has read as many books as I have about the Pacific war, they really begin to value these things. When I read about a carrier, I wonder about the location and construction of the fuel and av-gas tanks and delivery systems. Damage control; pilot recovery doctrine; pilot training. I think that you probably think about those things too.

Always interesting, thank you.

One grandpa was in the 75th Rangers, Sicily and D-Day. My other grandpa was a water cooled aircraft engine instructor for most of the war. He was an auto and boat mech when the war started, already 28. He was deployed to Iwo Jima at the end of the war with a P-51 squadron. He always told me the Navy and Marine crews were better than most of its in the Army because the training plan was years ahead. Did they call it phase maintenance back then or was that a newer term? My grandpa never used it when talking about his work but I never had a chance to ask after I got into the Navy in 1990. He passed in 1991.

This was mind-blowing, I had no idea that the navy had these mobile capabilities. Incredible video and going shopping for books!!!🎉

Fantastic video. Thanks!

Thank you for this.. very good information…

Great info! Thanks!

I enjoyed your video and I gave it a Thumbs Up

Interesting to see how the abundance of newly built aircraft impacted the need for repairs. The USSR had a similar paradigm with tanks during the Cold War. With the rate of attrition and the operational tempo it was more efficient to simply bring up fresh tanks.

Fantastic video, thank you. I'll have to add Sustaining Carriers to my read list. I'm really curious, does that book go into details about when exactly that transition over from 'build planes and their spare parts' to ' just build more planes and replace them vs. fix them' makes sense to occur? I would imagine that has to happen in any long drawn out war where industrial capacity becomes a major factor. I haven't read anything about it, but thinking about modern examples I wonder if the same thing happened with MRAPs in Iraq and Afghanistan. And now in Ukraine, obviously many or all pieces of equipment are still so rare that it makes sense to repair damaged equipment, but I wonder what conditions might lead towards that transition, and how it might be accelerated. Anyway, thanks again, great video!

I have long known how important all this from reading the history of Panzer units on the Eastern Front during W W II. This is still a good review of this subject in terms of the USN.

Interesting information on how they overlooked logistics, in spite of transitioning weapons platforms in the midst of war. We see a similar obliviousness to the need for trained people in energy transitions deemed the equivalent of wartime mobilization: we lack people to mine and refine critical minerals, build out power grids, and etc. Plus ca change…

"Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics” is attributed to several people, plausibly Liddell Hart. It's nicely demonstrated in the career of the excellent Dwight Eisenhower, whose first job after graduating from West Point was lecturing on supply -- at West Point. He had a number of staff jobs, notably getting to know Flash MacArthur, the loudmouth who lost the Philippines, rather better than anybody should have to, but then he went back to being a logistics intellectual -- before being leapt up several layers to overall campaign chief by the superb General Marshall. One of my favourite Eisenhower stories may come from journalist Murray Kempton: on D-Day he had landing craft carrying rock-crushing and road building equipment actoss the Channel: he saw well in advance that the French and then the German road networks were going to evaporate under his tanks' treads. So: good to see you doing the same thing here for Naval Aviation. Logistics.

Excellent video Christoph. Fascinating history. Thank you. I have ordered Mr Fisher’s book plus Cold War Test Pilot, Brown Water Navy and a book about Schnellbootes, using your discount code.

I love the still photo at 11:10 where it can be seen clearly some bloke repairing a piano in the background. Obviously music in the bar was considered essential at that juncture.

Good info, good video!

Quite interesting to see our history youtubers talking more about the logistics of things than just the battles and fighting aspects. Not too long ago a video came out titled "six oilers" with the named ships. They talk about how on top of fleet oilers and the sangamon sisters. There were fresh water ships for example. On the topic of this video, another ship that helped with aviation logistics was HMS Unicorn, yes she's British but she's an aircraft ferry, maintenance and light aircraft carrier. She did also help in the Pacific as well. I love this, its fine quoting famous generals who talk about logistics but its useless if dont actually talk about logistics in military history. So to our history youtubers (spread this message) keep this talk about the logistics side of things going.

They had real trouble knocking out 🇬🇧 carriers in the far east also. Not because of quantity though but they were so tough with steel decks and thick hulls.

Awesome episode, yes indeed logistics is and has been the foothold of victory whenever it was and is acknowledged. Absolutely agree on the fact that most documentaries just forego on this subject, where without this information the narrative lacks the necessary historical, strategical and logistical depth. Always wondered on the missions near Midway and the Marianas in which the common story tells a large number of planes were ditched, or, because of nighttime landings, damaged and thrown overboard. The majority of those stories don’t tell about the units which were working round the clock to replace the planes within a fortnight. It is evident that by doing so, these units haven’t received the awe and respect they deserved. Wonder why that is, is indeed the ‘ace’ more sexy than the mechanics? After all, without the mechanics, for whatever unit they were assigned to, no ace would have been able to achieve the results history seems so eager to focus on. Henceforth a more than interesting episode, plus a true and sincere reminder of the sweat and blood spilled by faithful and apt hands and minds.

@7:24 It's quite amazing that there is not a single one of those Devastators left. They did find some sunk on carriers though in great shape.

Cool video Bis!

You showed a clip of Clark Gable being inducted as an officer into the Army Air Corps.

Great video. Now in comparison to this might, consider that Ian Toll's trilogy on the pacific war contains a passage that (paraphrasing) every single Mitsubishi Zero built had to be towed by oxen to the nearest airfield, because the factory had no suitable roads or railways connecting for any alternative transport. When you think of the logistic constraints the Axis fought under, like this, or like the Wehrmacht being largely horse-drawn, it is simply astounding that they ever thought they could win.

I read somewhere that by the end of the war, there were so many pilots in the training pipeline that training was taking two years, and pilots reaching the fleet were better trained than any others in the world. Guess that goes along with having so many extra airplanes.

Great video!

I recommend Ian W. Toll's three book series on War in the Pacific. He goes into depth on how the US, although caught out by the Pearl harbor attack, was already in the process of ramping up the Pacific fleet and putting in place the logistics required to eventually win a conflict with Japan. US war planners had, for almost 2 decades, planned on who they were going to war with in the Pacific. As Admiral Nimitz put it (and I paraphrase a bit here) "We developed Plan Orange in the 20's and that is exactly how we fought the war in the Pacific". Also, I believe it was one of the great generals (Von Clausewitz??, and again I paraphrase) who said "Good generals focus on tactics, great generals focus on logistics". Thank you for providing some focus and insight on this critical aspect of the Pacific war.

this really does plug the massive gap in my knowledge that I didn't know I had people ask questions like "what if the Germans won WW2" or "what if the Japanese won WW2" but the truth is that they never stood a chance. It's such a strange thing to think of when you read the history though, the axis always felt like an overwhelming force, something that the allies were only just barely able to defeat. And the reason is that a battle between two technologically equal nations will feel even and intense in the conflict itself, but the bigger issues of logistics, production, maintenance, and replacement are silently winning the war in the background. Most servicemen probably feared their opponents, or saw them as a real threat. It's hard to have such a positive top-down view even when you're in high command. The capability of any nation to hold out is so far beyond what it takes to take away their strategic capability to win. Real victories are grinding, slow, and painful. And so it feels evenly matched, even when it's not

part of the reason why the US spends SO MUCH on its military is because they really understand the need for training and maintenance and supplies.

My Ex's Dad Charles Johnson was with the 5 th Airforce in the Pacific they were a repair base in New Guinea their job was not only to repair the planes shot up all to hell but they assembled the new planes coming off the ships. As soon as the planes came into port they took them off ship and immediately started assembling them. I went through his old picture and there is a picture of the out fit in a Brand New P-38 it was the 1000's plane they assembled . Here is some more history on the 5 th Air Force repair section. Here is some more history that is forgotten . They had to retro fit around 1000 + P-47s with external fuel tanks in 7 days for a bombing mission. What they did for the Crew Chiefs is they set up a grill inside the hanger they had pots of coffee and Chocolate bars and freshly cooked food for the crew. They worked around the clock 12 hour shifts they not only got all the P-47s refitted for the drop tanks in 7 days but they beat ahead of schedule ! In Charlies paper work after he passed away I ran a across a letter from the Commander of the Pacific fleet commending the Unit for not only getting the job done but a ahead of schedule. The Bombing mission was a total successs! I was lucky enough to talk to two of the last survivors of the outfit . One man Fred Chew was very intelligent he told me it took 8 full hours just to adjust the valve lash on a P-47 there was a picture of him working on a 47 . I got to also talk to Jim Murdock his long time friend that was also in the out fit . Fred told me a story about Charlie he was inside the cockpit doing something while Jim and Fred where doing a fuel flow test on a P-47 Charlie for some reason hit the mag while they were cranking the engine over and the plane blew up in flames they jumped up on the wing and jerked Charlie out of the cock pit saving his life ! What a great bunch of guys they are long gone now . I have more stories but nobody seems to give a shit anymore so I will quit writing but I had to tell the story

Having been a Marine aviation repair tech in the 1980's this is a great presentation of aviation history. Maintenance never gets enough credit. The folks I worked with were incredibly smart and dedicated. While deployed on the USS Ranger we took a lot of pride in helping to maintain aircraft uptime. I have always admired the Navy and Marine ingenuity, perseverance and creativity in performing maintenance on incredibly complex aircraft while at sea. Now I can appreciate the origins of the sea borne maintenance organizations.

The Army had a fleet of ships called Aircraft Maintenance Unit that supplied Sub-Depot level maintenance and repair to USAAF airfields on islands during the Island Hopping Campaign. The Air Force Historical Research Agency has the unit histories on microfilm that are availible. I used these reports to write Lineage and Honors Statements for active units that were once AMUs when I worked there 96-99.

I was in the Navy from 70 to 90 and spent 10 years in squadrons and 10 years in AIMD. AIMD, or Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department. Every Air Station and every Carrier had this department. This was the last decendant of this WW2 system. Even those capabilities are greatly diminished or gone entirely. The well established Depot system has been more, or less greatly diminished, or vanished entirely.

Logistics: If it was easy, it would be called tactics.

Not going to lie. The way you made the flow of this video really made me anticipate for the US Navy to throw away "worn out" aircraft. Just brilliant! 👏

Did you get to Wichita on your trip? In addition to an abundance of replacement aircraft, the US turned out an abundance of replacement air crew, partially due to the mass of trainers produced in Wichita. Logistics, logistics and even more logistics. Great vid as always MAH.

Glad you mentioned the escort carriers, which were pretty much the USN's secret weapon in the War in the Pacific: they could ferry entire fleets of planes, support the main CVs in offensive operations, and assist in convoy protection. 77 of the 115 carriers we put to sea in WW2 were escort carriers...sadly, I don't think a single one of them survived the scrapyard though.

I read an article on Wikipedia which said that as of war's end, the U.S. Navy had 54 aircraft carriers on station in the Pacific Ocean. I think the split was 24 big fleet carriers and 30 light "jeep" carriers, but by whatever count, they had so many carriers they were coming out of the Navy's ears. And more were about to be commissioned, including the 3 very large Midway class ships.

Thanks. Always nice to learn new things. From 1976 to 1979 I was a Marine Corps avionics technician. When assigned to USS Tripoli/LPH-10 I spent eight months working my specialty (UHF radios) in the AIMD (Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Division) and I was familiar with the spare parts down in ship's stores aboard that helicopter carrier. All parts had to be accounted for. During my time as an avionics technician the Corps was into fixing and repairing equipment rather than replacement. One day I received a scorched AN/ARC-51 UHF radio that had survived the crash of a CH-46 helicopter in Hawaii. The radio was fine, but the air crew was toast. I found out a month later that the First Mech was a friend of mine.

The 1945 numbers are just insane! My brain can't process the amount of ships the US Navy had and how fast they were spitting out new ships. Totally mindblowing.

Drachinifel dives into this in his Damage Control video, it's worth it for going deep into this one specific area and how the two sides approached it differently.

Thank you.